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Abstract
A strong contention of the “representative turn” is that representation is consubstantial with politics (Saward, 2010). One
way to test the heuristic value of this vision is to look for representation in an institution that was historically built against
representation, namely participatory budgeting (PB), a democratic innovation that has spread globally with exceptional
rapidity. The literature on PB identifies two types of relationships between participation and representation: (i) participa-
tion “challenges” (Houtzager & Gurza Lavalle, 2009) existing forms and principles of representation (through “assumed
representation” by civil society activists; or through “citizen agents”; Montambeault, 2016); or (ii) participation is “instru-
mentalised” (Fischer, 2012) by classic forms and actors of representation. On the basis of a comparative analysis of PB
experiences in Chengdu (China) and Delhi (India), we argue in this article that a third type of relationship can be observed:
participation—as implemented through PB—can also redistribute representation insofar as new, official representative
roles are created. Moreover, looking at these new roles provides important clues about the principles of representation
that are implemented and therefore about the transformative nature of PB.
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1. Introduction
One strong contention of the “representative turn” in
political science is that representation is consubstantial
with politics (Saward, 2010); in other words, “represen-
tation is everywhere” (Näsström, 2011, p. 508). In order
to test the heuristic value of this vision, it seems interest-
ing to look for representation in an institution that was
historically built against representation, namely partici-
patory budgeting (PB). PB is a participatory device that
is meant to provide a necessary answer, a corrective,
to the democratic deficit of representative democracy
(Baiocchi & Ganuza, 2014; Wampler, 2012a).
This democratic innovation was born in the Brazilian
city of Porto Alegre in 1989. One finds “at its heart a rel-
atively simple idea: citizens deciding over the priorities
and projects that make up a public budget” (Baiocchi &
Ganuza, 2014). Basically, citizens and social organisations
are provided a platform to discuss the priority of different
projects and vote on the expenditure plan, which gives
local citizens a voice over and the ability to supervise
the proposed budgetary expenditure of the government,
thereby in theory made more transparent, inclusive and
responsible (Chen, 2007; Shah, 2007; Wampler, 2000).
This innovative, grassroots and democratic bud-
getary decision-making process has spread globally with
exceptional rapidity: first to hundreds of municipalities
in Brazil and other South American countries, then to
thousands of cities on all continents since the 1990s
(Sintomer, Herzberg, & Allegretti, 2013), even though it
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remains today less developed in Asia than elsewhere. In
this circulation process PB has undergone many adapta-
tions, which have been closely observed by scholars. The
first wave of studies on PB tended to focus on success-
ful cases, investigating outcomes and contextual varia-
tions, and developing a comparative framework (Avritzer,
2006; Baiocchi, 2005; Santos, 1998; Sintomer et al., 2013;
Sintomer, Herzberg, & Röcke, 2008; Wampler, 2007).
Later research tempered this enthusiasm by putting into
perspective the dynamic implementation of PB in model
cases like Porto Alegre with the weaker impact PB has
had on some municipalities where it was peripheral to
city administrations; its outcomes were technically over-
determined; and the decision-making of participantswas
far removed from any locus of local power (He, 2011;
Sintomer et al., 2008). Indeed a question that runs
through much of this literature regards what is left of
the initial radicalism of the Porto Alegre experience in
its later avatars (Baiocchi & Ganuza, 2014; Cabannes &
Lipietz, 2018; Wampler, 2012b). To what extent does PB
remain, as in Porto Alegre, a transformative, empower-
ing institution attached to the project of democratizing
democracy? How far has it become, on the contrary, a
managerial, communication-centred device compatible
with neo-liberalism?
The relationship of PB with political representation
is an important indicator of the direction taken. Indeed,
the literature on PB suggests two possible relationships
between participation and representation. A first sce-
nario is that participation “challenges” existing forms
and principles of representation (Houtzager & Gurza
Lavalle, 2009) through a new, “assumed representation”
by civil society activists, but also by “citizen agents”
(Montambeault, 2016). The second scenario is that par-
ticipation is “instrumentalised” by classic actors of rep-
resentation (Fischer, 2012, p. 18), starting with mayors
and other local elected representatives; participatory
devices such as PB then become political tools used
by elected representatives to communicate about their
action, and more generally to relegitimate themselves
(Baiocchi & Ganuza, 2014; Bherer, Fernández-Martínez,
Espín, & Sánchez, 2016). We argue in this article that a
third type of relationship can exist. Indeed, our study of
PB in Chengdu (China) and Delhi (India) leads us to ob-
serve that participation can also redistribute represen-
tation insofar as new, official representative roles are
created; moreover, these new roles provide important
clues about the principles of representation that are im-
plemented in the PB process.
2. Methods and Data
The article offers a comparative analysis of two case stud-
ies conducted between 2014 and 2019 in Delhi and in
Chengdu. In both cities we collected data about the lo-
cal PB process in order to answer two main, open ques-
tions: (i) How is PB—a global democratic innovation—
implemented/interpreted/adapted in the particular con-
text under study? And (ii) what forms of political repre-
sentation can one observe in this process?
With regard to these questions, Chengdu and Delhi
appeared as potentially “instructive cases” (Eckstein,
2009, p. 139) for two main reasons. Firstly, as we said,
they are among the rare examples of PB in Asia. Secondly,
and more importantly, PB processes in Chengdu and
Delhi can be a priori considered as “most contrasted”
cases because they are embedded in very different po-
litical regimes: India and China have divergent theories
and practices of political representation. Despite the il-
liberal turn taken with the coming to power of Narendra
Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) since 2014, India
has so far remained a democracy built on competitive
elections, relatively free media, an independent judi-
ciary and an active civil society. On the Chinese side,
although communist rule underwent great evolutions
over the last 70 years, in this one-party system based
on the concept of the Leninist vanguard party, politi-
cal representation has invariably been defined by the
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) as the capacity to rep-
resent the interest of the majority of the Chinese people
(see Frenkiel & Shpakovskaya, 2019). This exclusive “rep-
resentative claim” (Saward, 2006) has considerably con-
strained pluralism, rule of law, freedom of speech and
demonstration. The fact that Chengdu appears, as we
will later see, as a clear case of “managerial” PB, while
Delhi looks like a more “transformative” case, was con-
gruent with this major contrast between the two politi-
cal systems.
However, the “intimacy of analysis” (Tarrow, 2010,
p. 243) that characterises case studies enabled us to see
that in both Chengdu and Delhi the local political con-
text ismarked, for different reasons, by a de-emphasis on
representation (something that is much more recent in
Delhi1 than in Chengdu). To put it briefly, in Delhi PB was
implemented by the AAP, a newparty thatwas born from
a strong critique of misrepresentation, and that placed
the development of citizen’s participation in decision-
making at the centre of its political project. In Chengdu,
like all over China, the CCP is still the sole representa-
tive claim maker and all other forms of representation
are minimized or suppressed (Frenkiel & Shpakovskaya,
2019). But the Party comprises 90 million members and
10 million civil servants (they do not necessarily belong
to the Party but above county level, all leading cadres
must be Party members) and the central leaders cannot
afford to be held responsible for the misdeeds of lower-
level leaders2. Its current strategy is to simultaneously
put them in check by grassroots participation (direct elec-
1 For an analysis of the exercise of power by the Aam Aadmi Party [AAP, Party of the Common Man] in Delhi, see Stéphanie Tawa Lama-Rewal, 2019.
2 To put it briefly, there are four administrative levels in China as provided in the Constitution: central, provincial, county/municipality and town-
ship/neighbourhood levels. The prefecture and the grassroots (village/community) levels are de facto but not de jure administrative divisions. Chengdu
(prefecture) comprises 9 urban districts, 4 municipalities or county-level cities (shi), 6 counties (xian), 12 city divisions (shiqu), 317 townships and
neighbourhoods (xiangzhen and jiedao) and 3432 villages and communities (cun and shequ).
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tion of village committees supplemented by PB and vil-
lage councils in some places, among a broad array of de-
vices), self-rule and CCP disciplinary commissions at cen-
tral and lower levels. Therefore, our cases are not as “con-
trasted” as could be expected at first.
In terms of data, the article is based on two qual-
itative surveys, conducted between 2014 and 2019 in
Delhi, and between 2016 and 2018 in Chengdu. In both
places the unit of analysis was the PB process set up by
regional authorities (i.e., the government of the National
Capital Territory of Delhi and the prefecture-level govern-
ment in Chengdu). We were interested both in the dis-
courses justifying the interest of PB and in implementa-
tion processes—with specific attention being paid to the
meetings that brought together citizens and authorities,
i.e., to situations, and even to the scenography (when
observable) of PB meetings. While the literature on PB
has discussed the important implications of having phys-
ical versus online interactions during the PB process, our
study suggests that the fact that physical interactions
happen in public or in closed meetings also matters a lot.
Thus, we conducted a series of interviews with local of-
ficials (i.e., elected representatives and functionaries of
local administrations) and other participants in PB, and
we also tried to directly observe, as much as possible, lo-
cal meetings.
In Delhi, 24 semi-directed interviews were done with
cadres, elected representatives and volunteers of the
AAP, as well as four interviews with NGO workers and
four interviews with bureaucrats working for the city-
state government. We could also directly observe two
neighbourhood assemblies, and since such meetings
are often video-recorded, we could analyse the video-
records of another five meetings.
In Chengdu, 23 semi-directed interviews were con-
ducted with cadres of the United Front department (in
Pengzhou and Chongzhou), village party secretaries, vil-
lage representatives and local scholars consulted in the
process. We could directly observe two village councils
and read the minutes of previous councils on the village
register as well as on official Internet portals whenever
available. Finally, we used official documentation and
media reports on PB in both cities.
In spite of important asymmetries between the PB ex-
periences conducted in Delhi and Chengdu (see Table 1),
we will show that a comparative analysis of these
two case studies can be theory-building (Tarrow, 2010,
p. 245). Indeed, our argumentwill outline two paradoxes.
One, although political representation is de-emphasized
in both cases, the very implementation process of PB ac-
tually generates new representative roles, i.e., “neigh-
borhood assembly coordinators” in Delhi and “village
representatives” in Chengdu. Two, in the Chinese, “good
governance” kind of PB, “village representatives” chal-
lenge, even if implicitly, the dominant theory of represen-
tation; while in the Indian, “transformative” kind of PB,
neighborhood assembly coordinators are actually dele-
gated representatives who implicitly re-affirm elections
as the main source of democratic legitimacy. The article
will show, therefore, that the forms and principles of rep-
resentation observed in PB processes complicate their
qualification along the radical/neo-liberal axis and con-
stitute important criteria to assess the transformative na-
ture of PB.
The first section of the article presents the main fea-
tures of the two PB experiences under study. In the sec-
ond section we argue that despite the clear asymmetry
between Chengdu and Delhi, the two cases present im-
portant similarities regarding (i) the justification of PB,
and (ii) the creation of new, official representative roles.
The third section focuses on contrasts between the two
experiences in terms of the place of procedures and sym-
bols; it then argues that although processes and situa-
tions are different, they give way in both cases to a redis-
tribution of political representation, and to some extent
to its redefinition.
3. PB in Chengdu and Delhi: Two Significant but
Asymmetric Experiments
Neither the Chengdu nor the Delhi PB are representative
of a national tendency. In China, the Brazilian idea of PB
was formally introduced in the context of campaigns to
open budgets since the 1990s, at a time of budgetary
reforms aimed at efficiency and accountability through
central and social control (Ma, 2009). In 2005, it was
practiced for the first time inWenling, Zhejiang province.
Different townships experimented differently. While PB
was introduced in Xinhe as a reform to promote the role
of the legislative branch in budgetary decision-making
and encourage citizen participation in congress deliber-
ations, in Zeguo, it took the form of deliberative polling.
PB was primarily focused on empowering citizens, rather
than the People’s Congress, tomake budgetary decisions
on capital projects (Fewsmith, 2013; Fishkin, He, Luskin,
& Siu, 2010; He, 2011; He & Thogersen, 2010; Li, 2005;
Ma, 2009). The pioneering introduction of PB has signif-
icantly evolved and has considerably but unequally ex-
panded since 2005. The experiences conducted there
have remained exceptional even though they have been
known and emulated all over the country. Only a few
other experiments have led to stable practice, such as
Wuxi, where, since 2006, resident representatives select
andprioritize among capital budget programsplannedby
the government (Wu &Wang, 2011) and Chengdu, since
2009 (Ming, 2014).
In India, a few experiences with PB did take place
before the Delhi janta ka budget (people’s budget).
The most ambitious one was the “People’s Plan cam-
paign”, implemented from 1996 onwards in the rural
areas of the southern state of Kerala (Heller & Isaac,
2003) by a coalition led by the Communist Party of India
(Marxist)—which however much weakened after four
years (Tharakan, 2005). In the southern city of Bangalore,
a civil society organisation, Janaagraha, organised a mi-
cro local version of PB in a selection ofmunicipal wards in
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2001, but again the experience was short lived and could
not be continued, let alone scaled up. Only themunicipal-
ity of Pune, on theWestern coast, managed to sustain an
initiative put in place in 2006, but this experiment with
PB has largely been limited to a collection of people’s de-
mands through the filling of forms.
The two cases under study are therefore neither
unique nor representative, but they are significant in
their respective national context, for different reasons.
Chengdu’s PB has proved to be durable and stabilized,
while Delhi’s experience, although short-lived, has been
remarkable for its radicalism and visibility.
Indeed, the PB scheme taking place in Chengdu’s
village councils, (yishihui, literally, meetings where ru-
ral inhabitants discuss official business, including bud-
get issues but not only), is an interesting case because
of its scale, design standardization and institutionaliza-
tion. The peculiarity of Chengdu’s village governance also
rests on some transfer of power from the elected vil-
lage committee (cunmin weiyuanhui) to the elected vil-
lage council, turned into a regular oversight and decision-
making institution addressing significant issues such as
how to use collective assets, allocate available financial
resources, and set the boundaries of agricultural land
onwhich households have use rights (village committees
are elected and have executive power to handle village
affairs. In places like Chengdu where the village coun-
cil, also translated as “village representative assembly” is
institutionalized and regularly convened, oversight and
horizontal accountability of elected village leaders im-
prove significantly).
These local meetings are organized to discuss vil-
lage projects, which have been made transparent and
open to deliberation within the framework of village
councils gathering, once amonth, local “representatives”
(daibiao) elected for this purpose. These meetings were
first sparsely organized for farmers to discuss land issues,
after the reform in land rights triggered by the Property
Law of 2007 and the severe and unsolvable conflicts it
led to. Moreover, after the devastating 2008 Wenchuan
earthquake, such deliberative platforms were all the
more needed to discuss reconstruction. Their embryonic
form originated inMayan village, Qionglai county, where
trusted residents, knowledgeable, skillful senior villagers,
party members, former village and local leaders who still
inhabited the villages, were invited to discuss and decide
land rights issues.
In 2009, former Party secretary of Sichuan province
Li Chuncheng decided to formally introduce PB in villages
with the help of scholars like Li Ling (Sichuan Academy
of Social Sciences). A regular platform was needed to
discuss budgets and projects after the 2008 earthquake,
as well as to alleviate citizen discontent with local offi-
cials, which slowed down policy implementation and led
to shangfang (petition and complaints) and protests that
spiked with the 2007 Property law3. To break down the
dual economy (i.e., the gap between rural and urban de-
velopment), Chengdu, which was designated “pilot city”
in 2003, created a single regional plan for public services
covering the entire Chengdu region. The plan prioritizes
rural infrastructures and the equalization of public ser-
vices between rural, peri-urban, and urban areas based
on a public fiscal system providing enough financial re-
sources, especially in rural Chengdu. What we call PB in
this article therefore refers to the significant budget allo-
cated since late 2008 by Chengdu prefecture for the im-
provement of village-level public services, called “Village
Level Public Services and Social Administration Funding”.
The process is rarely referred to as PB (canyushi yusuan)
in Chengdu. Chengdu’s prefecture-level government di-
rectly shares revenue with villages, which in 2009 re-
ceived at least 200,000 RMB (32,000 USD) (Ming, 2014)4.
Since its implementation ten years ago, the funding has
first doubled, then tripled. Besides, if local authorities (at
township or higher level) plan and implement the ma-
jority of rural investment, 8 out of the 59 rural public
services classified by the Chengdu government are de-
livered by local villages whose residents are required to
participate directly in their local public decisions and ser-
vices. Over the first three PB cycles, PB funded nearly
40,000 projects decided by local residents and imple-
mented in over 2,300 villages. The per capita annual
amount debated was around 22 USD, which ranks quite
high in world comparisons and is probably equivalent or
slightly higher nowadays.
Villages experimented in various ways with PB until
the process was strictly stabilized and institutionalized
under the “deliberation and social dialogue system” in
Pengzhou, a 1.2 million-inhabitant municipality located
north of Chengdu, where the recent urbanization and
pluralisation of interests, the fast sale of collective rural
land aswell as polluting petrochemical industry triggered
conflicts. Having the pioneer experiments in Wenling,
which lacked institutional stability, in mind, local lead-
ers and scholars decided to coordinate the process more
strictly with the township level and the people’s congress
so as to write it into the local law. As this is highly uncom-
mon, it drew the attention of senior leaders and scholars
and was spread to the whole Chengdu region after the
18th central party congress (2013), which endorsed pop-
ular participation.
In Delhi, PB was introduced for the first time in 2015,
shortly after the AAP won regional elections with a his-
toric score (67 seats out of a total of 70). PB occupied
an important place in the discourse of the newly elected
party. Organising assemblies (sabhas) open to everyone,
at the truly local level of the neighborhood (mohalla),
where priorities regarding local services and infrastruc-
tures could be collectively identified, andwhere thework
done by local authorities could be monitored, was pre-
3 The reform maintained state ownership over land but gave individual use rights the same level of protection as afforded state and collective rights.
4 This amount has increased every year. It amounted to 47,500 USD in 2011 and 50,000 USD (with a maximum of 85,000 USD) in 2012 (Ming, 2014).
More recently, allocated budgets have hovered between 400,000 RMB and 800,000 RMB (58,500 USD–115,000 USD).
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sented as giving substance to a notion that was cen-
tral in the party’s discourse, namely “self-rule” (Swaraj).
PB was meant to demonstrate the party’s seriousness
when it came to the two main ideas around which it was
formed: (i) the need to fight political and bureaucratic
corruption by developing transparency and accountabil-
ity; (ii) the imperative to make democracy more partici-
patory through decentralisation and the institutionaliza-
tion of various devices making it possible for people to
take part in decision-making. All this was expected to
make governance at the same timemore democratic and
more efficient.
Therefore, when PB was implemented in the Spring
of 2015, this was done with much fanfare, the mobilisa-
tion of all state resources and the strong involvement of
the party’s top leaders. However, it was decided that im-
plementation would proceed in two phases: there would
first be a pilot experiment on a sample of 11 constituen-
cies (all of them having elected an AAP representative);
and on the basis of that experiment, the “people’s bud-
get” would take place all over Delhi the following year.
We will here focus on neighbourhood assemblies
(mohalla sabhas), which are the most visible and ar-
guably the most significant moment of the PB process in
terms of political representation. Some 400 such assem-
blies were organised in April–May 2015, most often in
local schools. Typically, these assemblies would involve
local residents, functionaries representing the various
departments in charge of local services and infrastruc-
tures (water, public works, horticulture, etc.), the locally
elected Member of the Legislative Assembly (MLA), and
two party volunteers nominated by him/her, and called
“mohalla sabha coordinators”.
In terms of budget, it was proposed in the pilot phase
that each neighbourhood assembly would be entitled to
deal with five million rupees every year. This amount ap-
pears rather modest, since altogether it makes up less
than 1% of the overall budget of the city-state of Delhi5;
yet this is a budget that makes it possible to construct or
improve urban infrastructures on a scale that can have a
real impact on the life of (poor) local residents, as for ex-
ample when public toilets, street lighting or sport equip-
ment are concerned.
In Delhi, the outcome of the “peoples’ budget” was
a mixed one. Participation in neighbourhood assemblies
was much weaker than expected (the average number
of participants was around 80 persons, out of about
4,500 local residents); and the selection of priority work
was not prepared through prior discussions (Rao, 2016).
Moreover, because Delhi’s governance is especially com-
plex (many types of works do not depend on the Delhi
government), people often suggested works on which
the Delhi government requires the cooperation of other
local authorities, such as municipal bodies or the paras-
tatal agencies depending on the Central government.
Such cooperation however was not forthcoming, and it
generated a loss of credibility both for elected represen-
tatives and for neighborhood assembly coordinators.
The party’s response was to act on the weaknesses
identified during the pilot experiment. From the Fall
2015 onwards, cadres organised the nomination and
training of about 6,000 assembly coordinators as well as
the mapping of infrastructures present in every neigh-
bourhood. Simultaneously, they started preparing a mo-
bile application that would allow coordinators to imme-
diately identify the department and official in charge of
such or such local amenity, in view of arming them for
the second phase of PB.
However, the second phase never happened. The
government of the city-state had always been a weak
one; but by mid-2015, tensions between the Delhi gov-
ernment and the Central government (dominated by
the BJP, a Hindu nationalist party) developed into a full-
fledged institutional tussle that ultimately resulted in the
paralysis of the former. As a result, the Swaraj Bill, a cru-
cial piece of legislation meant to institutionalize neigh-
bourhood assemblies and PB, was never notified, and
the whole process was suspended indefinitely. The team
of cadres in charge of PB then decided to refocus their
energies on the education sector, and more precisely
on School Management Committees’ mahasabhas (su-
per assemblies). Thus, organisational learning was devi-
ated onto another participatory scheme, focusing on gov-
ernment schools6.
The fact that the PB process was not repeated after
the first year clearly makes Delhi a limit case if we con-
sider the defining criteria of PB proposed by Sintomer,
Herzberg and Allegretti (2013), namely that (i) discus-
sions focus on financial/budgetary processes; (ii) the city
level, or a (decentralized) district with an elected body
and some power over administration and resources is in-
volved; (iii) the process is repeated over years; (iv) some
form of public deliberation is included within the frame-
work of specific meetings/forums; and (v) some account-
ability is required so that the output reflects the pub-
lic will (Sintomer et al., 2013, p. 11). Yet since the Delhi
PB was meant to be repeated, and since it found a new
expression around the school management committees,
we will consider it as a real, if failed, case of PB.
As regards PB in Chengdu, all but criterion (ii) aremet,
which does not invalidate its classification as PB given the
relative decentralization of the Chinese administration
and autonomy of villages, the size of the affected pop-
ulations (Chinese villages would demographically qualify
5 In the Indian constitutional architecture Delhi has a specific status: since the adoption of the 69th Constitutional Amendment Act in 1991, Delhi has
been a “quasi-state”, officially called the National Capital Territory of Delhi (NCTD). Like the other 29 states of the Union, the NCTD has its own legislative
assembly and government, but this government is weak because it has no control over three domains that, in this particular case, pertain to the Central
government, namely land development, police, and law and order. Delhi is therefore a city-state, and its Chief minister is closer to a city-manager; yet
the centrality of Delhi in India’s political life confers disproportionate media attention to what its government says and does.
6 In the typology of PB proposed by Cabannes and Lipietz (2018), SMCmahasabhas would arguably qualify as “thematic”, “actor based” PB (as opposed
to territorially based).
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Table 1. Basic features of PB in Chengdu and Delhi.
Chengdu Delhi
Population 16 million 17 million
Urban/rural 70% urban Mostly urban
Key institution for PB Yishihui (village council and urban Mohalla sabha (neighbourhood assembly)
community council)
Participants Residents elected for three years; village party Voters of the neighbourhood;mohalla sabha
secretary; sometimes bureaucrats coordinators; (sometimes) locally elected MLAs;
bureaucrats from the concerned departments
Dates 2008–now 2015–2016
Eligible projects Basic services and infrastructure; training; Basic services and infrastructure (footpaths,
local management sewers, parks, public lighting…)
as cities in many countries) and the financial significance
of the allocated budget.
Table 1 highlights the many asymmetries between
the two experiments under study: in their magnitude,
degree of institutionalization, engineering, domains of
intervention, and also in the interest they have evoked.
One must note, among the many contrasts, the fact that
PB meetings are closed in Chengdu (only the minutes
are available), whereas they are public in Delhi. This fact
will prove important regarding the type of representa-
tion generated by such meetings, as we shall see.
4. A Common Democratic and Managerial Promise
Despite the contrasts highlighted above, the two expe-
riences conducted in Delhi and Chengdu also have a
lot in common: they combine, like many cases of PB
elsewhere, a “democratic promise” (Cabannes & Lipietz,
2018) with a managerial one—although in different pro-
portions. Indeed, in both cases PB is presented, in the
discourse of the organizing party, as a means to asso-
ciate citizens to decisions that concern them, but also as
a way to fight corruption. In other words, PB is supposed
to make decision-making at the local level more demo-
cratic and more efficient at the same time.
The Chengdu experience highlights the place of
democracy in Chinese political discourse. Electoral
democracy’s expansion has been blocked beyond grass-
roots level. Its most daring experimentation was located
in Buyun township, also located in Sichuan province. In
Chengdu, the yishihui is officially associated with “con-
sultative democracy” (xieshangminzhu, also strategically
but confusingly translated as deliberative democracy)
and public participation (gonggong canyu). Consultative
democracy is officially defined as a democratic pattern in
which, led by the CCP, all sections of society are consulted
on major issues before and during policy-making pro-
cesses. This notion has been more abundantly resorted
to since 2012 to justify the Party’s claim to represent the
whole of the Chinese people. In order to represent such
a diverse and large population (and now officially recog-
nized as such), the Partymust not only organize consulta-
tion of the eight authorized non-communist parties (es-
pecially thanks to institutions such as the United Front7),
diverse political, economic, academic elites8 but also the
common people. Consultation is more encouraged than
previously in national and local congresses and in the po-
litical consultative conference system, but a new stress is
especially put on consulting grassroots organizations and
organizing debates at the grassroots level.
The monthly meetings organized in Chengdu are lo-
cal interpretations of these central orientations. As one
council representative explains, yishihui are “meetings
representing the views of themasses because they serve
as a bridge for the bottom and the top to communi-
cate” (Interview with yishihui representative, Chengdu,
July 2016). They offer a platform for village represen-
tatives to express their neighbours’ views and get in-
volved in the decision-making process. In both official
and informal discourse, representation is de-emphasized.
The yishihui participants are designated as yishihui rep-
resentatives (daibiao), participants (canyuzhe) or mem-
bers (chengyuan) but it is striking that representation
is more often than not completely erased as partici-
pants are equalled with masses (qunzhong), residents
(cunmin, jumin), peasants (nongmin) or common peo-
ple (laobaixing) and more rarely with citizens (gongmin).
Representation in this case seems to pertain to identity
or embodiment representation (“acting as”), whereby
the relation of representation is supposed to be based
on an immediate community of interests, opinions, be-
liefs and often identity between the representative and
7 TheUnited Frontwork department is a CCP agency created during the civil war (1945–1949) and reestablished under Deng Xiaopingwhich is in charge of
managing relations with the non-Communist Party elite (including the eight minor parties, individuals and organizations holding social, commercial, or
academic influence, or who represent important interest groups, both inside and outside China). Its shrinking role is currently being redefined but there
are still branches at all administrative levels to guarantee CCP oversight over groups that are not directly associated with the Party and government.
8 Jiang Zemin’s “Three Represents” theory, ratified at the 16th Party Congress in 2002 reflects the CCP’s attempt to adapt to the new realities and
represent new social groups such as entrepreneurs and intellectuals.
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the represented, more than the expression of consent.
(Sintomer, 2013). Identity representation appears to con-
fer more legitimacy to yishihui representatives than the
fact that they have been elected by villagers.
Yishihui meetings aim at reducing the tensions and
conflicts rising at the most grassroots level (“nipping
them in the bud”) through empowering common citizens
to have a say in local budgets and supervising official
practice. They are designed to limit corruption and re-
store public trust in authorities through making local in-
vestments, supposed to further economic development
and reduce inequalities (especially rural vs. urban), more
transparent and collectively debated. With these meet-
ings, common citizens are expected to “decide” (jueding,
shuo le suan) and “solve their problems among them-
selves” while the role of elected village committee mem-
bers and selected members of the party branch is re-
duced to convening andmoderating themeetings aswell
as taking stock of the decisions and reporting them to
higher authorities and higher cadres and bureaucrats,
who attend only if and when invited by the councils.
The real objective of institutionalizing these oversight
assemblies is to reduce social instability and conflicts
and therefore complaint and petitioning through boost-
ing self-governing and autonomy at the village and com-
munity level, and compelling the village committee as
well as local officials to be more transparent, efficient
and accountable.
Since in China local congress representatives (renda
daibiao) are often devoid of power, and local congresses
are rubber stamp institutions representing the Party
more than citizens, local cadres are powerful but discon-
nected frompopular needs. The absence of electoral rep-
resentation entices them to respond above all to higher
authorities and promotional standards. Besides, it does
not prevent corruption by personal, family, clanic, pri-
vate interests. Village councils have the potential to give
more clout to these local congresses especially regarding
budget issues, forcing local officials to respond to the ac-
tual needs of the local population, and also give them
arguments to reject extravagant (called “face projects”)
or disconnected projects imposed by their hierarchy.
Leaders (village committee members, village party
secretary and indirectly county officials) undeniably lose
a great part of their discretionary powers by “letting
masses decide for themselves” but according to local
scholars like Li Ling (personal communication, October,
2016), a broad consensus exists among officials at vari-
ous administrative levels because PB in the form of the
yishihui has proven to be an efficient governance instru-
ment in all these respects, and it is also conceived as
cultivating the competence of citizens, who are made to
understand the complexity of policy-making and better
comply with government decisions. The discourse on PB
in Chengdu therefore invokes both democracy and good
governance as PB appears as a managerial device aim-
ing at efficient governance through popular participation
and oversight.
In Delhi, like in Chengdu, corruption is a central
theme that connects the democratic and the manage-
rial promises of PB. Indeed, the AAP was born from
the “India Against Corruption” movement that shook
the country’s large cities in 2011–2012 (see Chowdhury,
2019). Thus, PB is presented as a means to correct the
misrepresentation of people’s “true interests”, misrepre-
sentation being caused by the fact that decision-making
happens in closed-door meetings, among people discon-
nected from ground realities and indulging in corruption.
It is proposed that PB, i.e., the direct involvement of lay
citizens in decisions concerning local affairs, will bring ef-
ficiency, as it will both decrease corruption and improve
the adequacy of decisions to real needs.
But if the anti-corruption theme is a strong link be-
tween our two cases, the discourse justifying PB is very
different in Delhi with regard to (i) the type of democ-
racy envisioned and (ii) the political function of PB for
the party. Indeed, in contrast with “consultative democ-
racy” in China, “participatory democracy” in the AAP’s
discourse signals the party’s radicalism in two senses:
firstly, participation is presented as a major way to trans-
form politics, to “change the rules”, to “reverse the
governance process” (Interview with AAP cadre, Delhi,
2017); secondly, it signals a will to return to the sources
of Indian democracy, identified with Gandhi’s political
thought. The neighbourhood assemblies experimented
with and theorized by the leaders of the AAP can indeed
be seen as the contemporary version of the “little re-
publics” celebrated by Gandhi in the 1930s (Tawa Lama-
Rewal, 2018b).
An analysis of the discourse of the AAP—as observ-
able through its manifestoes, leaders’ public speeches
but also interviews with cadres, elected representa-
tives and volunteers—helps understanding how partic-
ipation is conceived by the party. It reveals that the
notion of participation encompasses several ideas—
including communication, consultation, discussion and
education—but that two aspects clearly dominate,
namely action/decision-making and control/surveillance
(of public authorities). On the whole there is little em-
phasis on discussion and debate, and no mention at all
of deliberation. A formula often used by party leaders
Arvind Kejriwal and Manish Sisodia while they were in-
troducing the concept of PB in the first neighbourhood
assemblies organized in May 2015 sums up this empha-
sis: “don’t say/think ‘our government’; say/think ‘we, the
government”’ (hamara sarkar nahi, ham sarkar). This
formula is typical of the de-emphasis (sometimes verg-
ing on the denial) of the role of representatives in the
AAP’s discourse (Tawa Lama-Rewal, 2019): we are told
that “elected representatives will implement people’s de-
cision” (AAP, 2014); that people will be the government.
One can read this injunction as an expression of the
fundamentals of the party, that reflect the trajectory
of its leaders, from anti-corruption activists to move-
ment organizers to party founders: ifmohalla sabhas are
meant, explicitly, to improve local governance by associ-
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ating local people to decisions regarding their own neigh-
bourhood, these are also, in a more implicit but equally
important manner, a mode of mobilization that aims at
putting constant pressure on local authorities. Thus, in
Delhi, PB is far from evoking a consensus among govern-
ment functionaries. In this respect, the few interviews
we could conduct (since bureaucrats are most often very
reluctant to give their opinion on policy issues) suggested
that at least two visions co-exist. At first, a mildly posi-
tive one was expressed by top-level civil servants (possi-
bly because these are more mindful of their duty to fol-
low orders). This first vision emphasized the benefits of
PB in terms of educating all stakeholders: PB, they said,
made bureaucrats more aware of local needs, and peo-
ple more aware of the intricacies of local governance. In
this vision, PB was a good initiative because it made lo-
cal governance more responsive to people’s needs. But
another, more negative vision was expressed by junior
bureaucrats. They underlined the burden, for them, of
having to work extra-hours to interact with people who
have no idea of the complexities of Delhi’s governance.
And above all, they resented having to bear the brunt of
people’s anger, in a context where residents, being gath-
ered as a collective, felt emboldened to criticize the ad-
ministration’s work. Indeed, neighbourhood assemblies
did force them to face the people as representatives of
the state; or at least of its administration.
Both our cases therefore seem to illustrate how the
democratic dimension of PB can be mitigated by its in-
strumentalization for managerial purposes. PB nonethe-
less redefines and redistributes representation.
5. The Paradoxical Emergence of New Forms
of Representation
Shifting the focus of investigation from discourses to
practices reveals that the “democratic promise” of PB
is realized in Chengdu mostly through strong proce-
dures, and in Delhi (where procedures are weak) mostly
through symbolism. Indeed, our close study of processes,
and more precisely our interest in the political signifi-
cance of the format of meetings in the two cities led us
to observe (i) that PB processes favour the emergence of
new, official types of representatives; and (ii) that these
representatives implicitly convey ideas on political rep-
resentation that are not necessarily congruent with the
dominant discourse (i.e., that of the CCP in Chengdu; that
of the AAP in Delhi).
Contrary to Delhi, not everyone participates in PB
meetings in Chengdu, where a new layer of represen-
tatives is created: they are local residents, supposed to
represent their neighbours, but they are expected to
be endowed with special skills, which blends concep-
tions of representation as description and distinction
(Sintomer, 2013). Representatives are also expected to
express themselves well, understand both their neigh-
bours and party cadres, and therefore to be propermedi-
ators. Following very detailed instructions, village repre-
sentatives are encouraged to consult their limited con-
stituency of neighbours, concoct and propose projects
they feel strongly about, and pass on information on new
policies as well as the sense that the CCP cares for their
needs and is responsive. The standardization of yishihui,
where budget and other important issues are collectively
discussed and supervised, therefore amounts to substan-
tial change as these meetings beef up the role of vil-
lage representatives (yishihui participants) while limit-
ing that of village committee members—who, although
elected by universal suffrage, do not meet very often,
are quite weak, and often find it difficult to override or
constrain the power of the appointed village party sec-
retary. According to the communicating vessels princi-
ple, the regularly convened and tightly organized yishihui
allows participants to finally gain some of the former
power of the village party secretary (also called yibashou,
“the number one guy”) who tended to hold on to his/her
traditional monopolistic power and make budget deci-
sions in all discretion, and even alleviate some of their
dependence on township authorities which many village
committees could not overcome. However, these resi-
dents among residents are legitimized by their neigh-
bours’ votes, which give them the mandate to meet ev-
ery month, make important decisions and substantially
represent their interests. They constantly interact and re-
spond to their constituents-neighbours which they em-
body (thus explaining why they are often called “resi-
dents”), and their role is conceived as amere conveyance
of views and projects—as skilled and selected mediators
voicing their neighbours’ grievances and expectations in
an audible (understandable, articulate and “civilized”)
manner. Village representatives can therefore be said to
be endowedwith a triple legitimacy (identity, procedural
and performance).
This is changing the traditional Leninist and Maoist
pattern of representation where the avant-garde con-
stituted by CCP cadres is indispensable to the expres-
sion of the masses’ interests as the latter, even though
sovereign, are not fully able to understand and express
them themselves without the former. Chengdu yishihui
guidelines however stipulate that there cannot be too
many party members involved. We may therefore won-
der if this Chengdu innovation is a small but decisive step
in the gradual formation of capable citizens finally able to
express themselves without the filter of the Party.
In Delhi, the new representatives officially created by
and for the implementation PB in 2015 were the neigh-
bourhood assembly coordinators. In order to organise
meetings in each neighbourhood, two “mohalla sabha
coordinators” were nominated by the locally elected rep-
resentative, theMLA. Their role was, before the meeting
of themohalla sabha, to inform local people and encour-
age them to participate; during the meeting they had
to moderate discussions between residents, but also be-
tween residents and bureaucrats representing the vari-
ous concerned departments (in charge of water, horti-
culture, roads, etc.); and after the meeting they were
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in charge of following up and making sure that depart-
mentswereworking as per the priorities identified by the
mohalla sabha. These coordinators were always party
volunteers; according toAAP cadres, the ideawas to have
onemale and one female coordinator in each neighbour-
hood, but our investigations suggest that women coordi-
nators were very few.
Mohalla sabha coordinators (now called “MLA rep-
resentatives” in the more recent context of School
Management Committees mahasabhas), being nomi-
nated by the MLA, really are delegated representatives;
as such they have no autonomy vis-à-vis the locally
elected representative; they are therefore not in a posi-
tion to alter power equations. In any case, since the “peo-
ple’s budget”, as we saw, was stopped in its tracks after
only one year by the Central government, these coordi-
nators had no opportunity to build on their new status.
However short their existence, it is worth noting that
the legitimacy of mohalla sabha coordinators as repre-
sentatives derives, although indirectly, from the MLA’s
electoral legitimacy. Indeed, the whole modus operandi
of PB inDelhi suggests that notwithstanding theAAP’s de-
emphasis on representation, the legitimacy offered by
elections remains central for the party. Neighbourhood
assemblies are organized around the local elected repre-
sentative (whether s/he is present in person or through
her/his nominees, the assembly coordinators), and sev-
eral aspects of the procedure implicitly refer to the princi-
ples of representative democracy. For instance, in order
to be allowed to participate in a neighbourhood assem-
bly, one must prove that one is a voter registered in the
local polling booth; therefore “local people” are in effect
defined not as residents but as voters. Also, the notion
of democratic decision-making is reduced to a very ba-
sic procedure of hand vote: the moderator of the assem-
bly will read aloud all the suggestions put forth by par-
ticipants, who are then invited to raise their hand when-
ever they support a suggestion; the prioritization of local
works to be done is based on counting the raised hands.
The pilot version of PB therefore manifests a rather sim-
plistic vision of what makes for democratic, participatory
decision-making9.
Thus, the observation of PB processes in Delhi sug-
gests two interesting contrasts with Chengdu. The first
contrast is that the procedural dimension of participation
is much less developed in the Indian capital city—indeed
it is much less developed than for (electoral) representa-
tion. The concrete organisation of elections in India re-
flects the State’s old and deep concern with issues of
freedom, fairness, and representativeness (Bajpai, 2016;
Jayal, 2016; Shani, 2018). By contrast, the organisation
of participatory spaces is often shallow. Mohalla sabhas
are one of the most ambitious experiences in participa-
tory democracy in the country, and yet, as we saw, they
did not have much to offer in terms of training partici-
pants or organising discussions.
But if mohalla sabhas are weak in terms of proce-
dure, they are strong in terms of symbolism—this is a
second contrast with Chengdu’s yishihui. Interviews with
AAP cadres involved in the organisation of PB reveal a
strong awareness of the importance of symbols for citi-
zenship building (Goetz & Jenkins, 2005; Nez, 2016; Tawa
Lama-Rewal, 2018b), in a context where bureaucrats are
not used to being accountable to ordinary citizens. These
cadres explained that there is a “message” involved in
the role played by the elected representative—or his/her
nominees—in the assemblies: the presence, in person or
by proxy, of the elected representative clearly signifies
that the party in power at the state level (the AAP) is
serious about this new process, which emboldens “the
common man” to actually address these “big people”.
Indeed, the fact that neighbourhood assemblies are
public meetings—that is, meetings in which all locally
registered voters can participate, but also meetings that
can be observed by anyone, including the press—is sig-
nificant regarding the question of political representa-
tion. Critics of the AAP have argued that these assem-
blies’ main objective is actually to enable the party’s
elected representatives to put on a show, to play the
role of the honest, devoted keepers of public interest
vis a vis the administration. The impatience with which
the newly elected government set up the “people’s bud-
get” certainly does suggest that one important concern
was to make the party’s commitment to decentralization
and participation visible. But the importance of visibility
is not necessarily limited to electoral calculations. The
mise en scene specific to neighbourhood assemblies ar-
guably makes not only the party, but also “the people”
and “the state” visible to each other in a new manner.
In other words, the public character of neighbourhood
assemblies generates passive symbolic representation10
in two ways: firstly, it forces onto participating bureau-
crats the role of representative of not only their specific
department, butmore generally—and symbolically—the
state. And secondly, it attributes to the few dozens of
voters who happen to participate in eachmohalla sabha
the role of representing “the (local) people”. Even though
India’s political life is replete with crowds who protest,
demonstrate or sit in the public space, such crowds,
through their spokespersons, usually address an absen-
tee state. And even though administrative offices are
open to the public, the public in these places usually is
9 However, interviews with party cadres reveal that this hurried aspect of the experiment was later regretted, and that rethinking was going on regard-
ing possible ways to organize a collective discussion before the assembly, so as to provide participants with enough information and time to produce
better choices.
10 Symbolic representation happens whenever the mere presence of one or several persons in a political context signifies that of a larger group, or of
an abstract entity; it is a more or less implicit way of “standing for” someone or something beyond oneself. The scholarship on symbolic representa-
tion (for instance Hayat, Péneau, & Sintomer, 2018; Pitkin, 1967) mostly focuses on active symbolic representation (for instance, the representation of
“women” by a female Minister, of “the nation” by the king, or of “the people” by a group of demonstrators), but it is important to note that symbolic
representation can also be passive, as in the case of bureaucrats participating in neighbourhood assemblies in Delhi.
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made up of individuals, or at most a fewmembers of the
same family. The staging of an exchange, in the public
space, between “the people” and “the state” is on the
whole a rarity. Thus, if neighbourhood assemblies offer
AAP elected representatives an opportunity for a (the-
atrical) performance of “giving power back to the peo-
ple”, they also constitute a political performance with
real didactic potential—on the condition, of course, that
such assemblies are organised on a regular basis, and
that they have concrete, visible outcomes.
In terms of political representation therefore, one
can identify two main outcomes of Delhi’s “people’s bud-
get”. Firstly, the formal nomination of neighbourhood
assembly coordinators by AAP elected representatives
manifests the tentative institutionalization of a new, dele-
gated type of representative. Secondly, the public charac-
ter of neighbourhood assemblies, and theirmise en scene
inspired from the “public hearings” organised by civil soci-
ety organisations (Tawa Lama-Rewal, 2018a), also favours
a symbolic type of representation (Saward, 2010).
6. Conclusion
The selection of Chengdu and Delhi as cases studies of
the relationship of PB with political representation con-
tributes to documenting the recent implementation of
this global democratic innovation in the Asian continent.
More importantly, it provides a heuristic contrast be-
tween a “managerial” type of PB, strong on procedures
but deprived of symbolism (Chengdu), and a “democratic”
type, strong on symbolism but weak on procedures
(Delhi). Contrary to expectations, we find that procedures
in Chengdu actually challenge the locally dominant defini-
tion of political representation, and that for all its symbol-
ism, PB in Delhi ultimately reaffirms a classic definition of
political representation as based on elections.
More precisely, our analysis of PB in Chengdu and
Delhi reveals that this participatory device, promoted in
a political discourse that de-emphasises representation,
actually generates new forms of representation; indeed,
it redistributes representation and it redefines it at the
same time.
In both our cases, PB redistributes representation: it
leads to the emergence of new representatives, besides
the usual, “official” ones (party secretaries and elected
village committees in Chengdu, MLAs in Delhi): both vil-
lage representatives andmohalla sabha coordinators do
claim, more or less explicitly, to “speak for” local citizens
and to “stand for” local interests, to paraphrase Hanna
Pitkin (1967).
In this process, political representation is redefined.
In Chengdu, village representatives are endowed with a
triple legitimacy (procedural, identity and performance).
They are legitimized by the mandate they receive from
their neighbours to meet every month, make impor-
tant decisions and substantially represent their interests.
They are also legitimate as they act as villagers and em-
body residents when they make decisions regarding vil-
lage investments but also land issues. In Delhi, the nom-
ination of assembly coordinators (who will be called
“MLA representatives” in the later participatory device
of schoolmanagement committees) by elected represen-
tatives (the MLAs) amounts to creating delegated repre-
sentatives; while themise en scene of meetings imposes
a passive, symbolic type of representation onto bureau-
crats and lay participants.
But does this challenge the larger political system?
How far can such redistribution go, considering that PB
is in both cases organised and controlled by the party in
power (at least at the local level)? Are village representa-
tives and mohalla sabha coordinators more than an ex-
tension of CCP cadres and AAPMLAs?More largely, what
is the significance of our observations, beyond the some-
what limited perimeter of PB?
In Chengdu, the existence and action of village rep-
resentatives de facto constitute a breach in the CCP’s
monopoly of political representation as it constrains the
role of the village party branch and the influence of
higher party cadres on it, as well as on the elected vil-
lage committee. It also seems to signal a step forward
in the training of capable citizens finally able to express
themselves without the filter of the avant-garde Party.
However, this has very limited consequences on the sys-
tem of representation because these decisions are cir-
cumscribed to the village-level without any impact on
the larger scale and more significant projects and poli-
cies. In Delhi, the significance of PB lies not so much in
the (limited) role played by delegated representatives as
in the public, confrontational dimension of interactions
between those who claim to represent the people (i.e.,
the MLA and his/her nominees) and bureaucrats, cast in
the new role of “representatives of the State”. Our com-
parative analysis therefore suggests that the forms and
principles of political representation observed in PB pro-
cesses constitute relevant and significant criteria to as-
sess the transformative nature of PB.
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